“狗树皮, 但大篷车上移动。”
阿拉伯谚语
汇款初创公司的基础’ PR pitch centers on a relatively intuitive concept concerning the role of banks: 它们是具有官僚文化的大型机构, 低于标准的客户服务, 和过时的数字能力. 所以, 银行退出跨境汇款行业只是时间问题. 讽刺地, 这个前提成立. A typical bank is notably behind in service quality and pricing compared to the leading fintech startups. 此外, most banks don’t consider a money transfer business to be strategic.
为什么银行不拿钱转账严重
假设银行不关心竞争是天真的想法. 仅在美国, 有 4,000 banks and countless credit unions whose executives obsessively compare their strategies to local and national competitors. 然而, banks naturally view their competition pragmatically: “What are the top five reasons for revenue slowdown?” 或 “哪些新的商业趋势可能会危及 10% 利润?”
You have probably heard that the market size of consumer cross-border money transfer services is substantial. According to the World Bank, remittances alone amount to nearly $0.9 兆, 整体跨境C2C交易量约为其两倍.
然而, 平均利润小于 4%, 甚至 $2 万亿数量将转化为大约 $70 消费者跨境汇款行业的全球收入达 10 亿美元. 由于银行的收入主要来自国内, 与银行相关的汇款收入部分要小得多. The United States, 全球最大的消费者汇款境外市场, contributes to about 20% 占全球收入的, 相当于大约 $15 billion.
那怎么办 $15 与美国四大银行目前的收入相比? 我们来看看整体情况, 消费者, 以及这些银行的跨境业务收入, 均名列前茅 25 全球银行:
如果将上图放大, 银行’ 目前的汇款收入变得几乎看不见. 它大约代表 0.5% 银行的’ 总收入或约为 1-1.5% 的消费银行收入.
由《卫报》提供, 您可以观察桑坦德银行的类似数据, 所有跨境相关业务都代表各地 1.5% 银行的 总 收入 (忽略关于耸人听闻和错误的观点 “10% 该集团的利润):
对于富国银行, 跨境汇款费用极低，以至于银行最后一次将其分开 2018:
即使其中一家银行奇迹般地成为该国唯一的汇款提供商, 在此过程中取代数百名竞争对手, 它只会获得额外的 10% 在其消费者业务之上.
银行竞争地位
All US banks’ annual cross-border consumer money transfer volume totals approximately $150 billion, accounting for about half of the USA outbound volume. 这个数字涵盖了所有类型的消费者, 包括银行的富裕客户’ 私人银行集团. 银行如此重要的市场份额并非美国独有. 例如, 从阿联酋转账至印度, 单一银行, 轴, 命令一个 20% 市场份额. Korea’s top 5 境外汇款提供商包括该国四大银行和西联汇款.
现在, 让我们来比较一下银行和跨境专业机构之间的跨境全球汇款量规模, 也称为汇款运营商 (跨国运营商), 包括金融科技公司:
每个国家最大的银行通常处理大部分交易和约一半的境外转账量:
顶级银行在转账量方面落后于领先的专家, 部分原因是它们在许多国家缺乏消费者存在. 然而, 在美国这样的单一国家内, the top two banks are not as far behind leading traditional MTOs and fintechs:
请注意这张图表，十年后, 美国四大银行集体转账量翻倍, 超过西联汇款的增长. 然而, smaller MTOs, especially fintechs, have grown much faster during the same period. In less than fifteen years since launch, Remitly transfers more volumes out of the US than any bank, 怀斯也不甘落后.
顶级银行不仅保持领先地位 10 outbound players within each country despite the growth of fintechs but are also becoming more digitally mature. 之间 2021 和 2023, 与钱包和汇款应用程序相比，银行移动应用程序的汇款使用量增长最快, 使其成为这三组中最常用的应用程序:
What Banks Don’t Like About Consumer Cross-Border Money Transfers
Besides being a minor bank revenue source, cross-border money transfer has become increasingly challenging. 正如另一篇文章中概述的 SaveOnSend 文章, 旨在打击恐怖主义融资的法规, money laundering, 和逃税, 当有必要时, 还对服务提供商进行了大量的资源和系统投资.
This burden is twofold for a large bank: offering customers cross-border money transfers and banking services to Money Transfer Operators (跨国运营商). 从合规角度来看，后一项业务已变得极其复杂, 主要银行集体关闭汇款提供商的账户, 被称为全球趋势 “去冒险“. 在本质上, 银行从为 MTO 提供服务中获得的利润并不能抵消法规带来的额外投资要求和法律风险. 以下是一位资深银行家私下描述与大型汇款公司持有代理账户相关的风险的方式 (“XYZ,” 保持匿名):
“我们有对我们银行监管行动严重关切，如果XYZ的X-边境客户端提交的非法活动. 为了管理风险, 我们的银行进行的XYZ每年两全天专用遵守尽职调查与反洗钱, Compliance, 支付委员会成员，并从利益相关者的风险, 银行和现金管理团队. 其中的首要任务是确保我们只实现业务占转移为XYZ和那些传输是为特定目的而进行的 (不赌, 毒品, 等等) – 作为供应商, 有时, 在知情或不知情, 歪曲类型的帐户及其用途. 讨论信贷承诺的为XYZ续期即使, 话题看似远离跨境转移的性质, 大约有三分之一的银行同业的下滑加入到我们的银行由于潜在的监管问题。”
到这一点, 去风险化主要影响了最小的 MTO, 加密货币交易所, and a handful of high-risk destinations such as Somalia or the Cayman Islands. 然而, it remains a significant concern even for the most prominent money transfer specialists. 他们中的大多数都有主要银行合作伙伴，但也与另一家主要银行保持一定的业务关系，作为预防措施.
Banks regularly audit remittance providers using their services to mitigate regulatory exposure. 所以, many bank employees understand how remittance specialists operate, whether Western Union or Wise. If the banks’ senior leadership were inclined to do so, 对于他们的汇款经理来说，复制相对简单 “最佳实践” 并专注于消费者汇款. 然而, 这不是他们选择追求的方向.
银行’ 汇款策略
有三个去对市场的机型在银行汇款:
- 忽视: 大多数银行只提供电汇.
- 优先: 建立一个独立的资金转账业务.
- 伙伴: 依靠专家来为客户服务.
银行’ 与现有 MTO 或金融科技公司的合作关系已存在多年. 在 2016, claiming it was a minor bottom-up experiment, TransferWise 与两家当时无关紧要的银行签约, N26和低热值. 它又签了一份 2017 (欧椋鸟). 2018 Transferwise 筹集了股份并创建了一个独立的全球合作伙伴团队，同时推出了 API 门户. 那年, 它失去了 欧椋鸟 并获得 Monzo:
还 2018 在七月, Transferwise与大型银行签订了第一个合作协议, BPCE, 但它从未投入生产. 2019, Transferwise 在美国和澳大利亚又签约了几家小型银行. 之后, the pace started to pick up. 早期 2024, Wise Platform had agreements with over 85 合伙人代表 10 万客户和企业 (N26 and Monzo have gotten much bigger since the signature days). Some partners even claim a 15% penetration, 但假设平均 5% 渗透, this line of business might already contribute 5-10% Wise 的活跃客户. Wise expects the majority of its volume to come through its API business one day.
Unsurprisingly, the world’s largest banks have ignored such partnerships because they are unconcerned about disruption, 而规模较小的银行通常没有有此类需求的客户. 例如, 在美国, 只有约 10% 的银行为其客户提供国际汇款服务. 讽刺地, 而不是摩根大通使用 Wise 作为汇款白标解决方案, Wise was the first to use Chase to offer interest-bearing accounts.
谁在使用银行进行汇款?
所有消费者群体都使用银行进行国际汇款, 包括最近的移民.
直到大约十年前, 移民更加依赖银行进行跨境转账. 然而, 供应商喜欢 西联汇款 和 XOOM 开始提供数字服务. 尽管如此, 随着越来越多的移民来到美国并开设银行账户，通过银行的汇款量持续增加:
然而, 银行汇款服务的典型用户不同于 MTO 和金融科技公司的客户. 让我们查看平均转账金额 (千美元) 顶级银行之间:
将此与线下汇款的平均本金额进行比较 (通过现金剂): $200-400 与数字: $1,000-2,000.
银行’ 初级消费者子段是不同: 汇款频率较低但汇款金额较大并使用电汇方式汇款的人. 但为什么富国银行的平均交易规模差异如此之大? It is the only US bank that actively targets traditional remittance consumers among its customers, with a dedicated product launched in1994 和一个单独的 登陆页面 在推出 2007:
在整体表现良好的同时, 富国银行在美国至菲律宾走廊尤其成功, 名列前茅 5 数字汇款提供商, 尽管收取高于平均水平的利润.
银行’ 汇款定价
Traditional bank services for money transfers tend to be expensive. TransferWise even claimed that banks are 10 贵几倍.
这些说法具有误导性 (看到这 SaveOnSend 文章了解更多), 但传统银行和汇款专家之间的定价差距仍然很大. This is primarily due to banks’ worse foreign exchange rates, which can be less transparent to customers than fees. 然而, 与北美相比，欧洲银行通过跨境转账赚钱的方式有所不同. 在欧洲, 银行收取更高的费用, 在北美时, 他们收取更高的外汇加价.
历史, 银行收取的费用不等 $25 to $50 用于电汇. 然而, the competition from fintech companies and the cost advantages of digital channels have resulted in considerably lower prices for online transfers than in-branch service.
Banks may not charge fees for higher-volume transfers. 例如, JP Morgan Chase, 美国最大的零售银行, 例如, doesn’t charge a fee for wire transfers exceeding $5,000:
当银行按汇率进行国际汇款时 2-3% 低于市场利率, 消除可见费用很容易. An average transfer of $10,000 translates to $200-300 通过低成本数字渠道每笔交易的收入. 生意不错.
客户喜欢他们的银行吗?
What about the quality of service for cross-border customers in those banks? 人们普遍认为消费者对银行持负面看法, with a cliche suggesting that millennials would prefer a root canal over dealing with a banker. In reality, 在千禧一代中, 对银行分行体验的满意度超过 80%. 另一方面, a sleek online interface might be perceived as less trustworthy when sending money.
It could even be argued that consumers strongly like their banks. 这缘分到底有多强? 以富国银行为例, for example, 卷入多起公共丑闻, 包括开设虚假账户和扣留保险退款. 该银行的客户是否将业务转移到了其他数千家银行中的任何一家，或者选择了一家时尚的金融科技初创公司? 没了, 他们坚持选择富国银行:
而且, 移民往往对在东道国提供服务的本国银行表现出强烈的忠诚度. PNB 是5日 菲律宾最大的银行并发挥着重要作用. 同样, ICICI银行和IndusInd, ranked #3 和 #10 在印度, continue to be active players for transfers from the US to India.
银行’ 服务质量
同样以美国银行, 许多非美国银行的汇款门户 (国民生产总值, ICICI, IndusInd) 似乎已经过时了十到二十年. Given the superior digital capabilities and pricing offered by MTOs and fintech players, it can perplex some that these banks continue to attract remittance business. 然而, this backwardness may evoke a sense of tradition and stability for some customers.
富国银行因其针对典型汇款的全面方法而在美国最大的银行中脱颖而出, 其他银行也可能有选择地参与. 例如, India is not only the world’s largest inbound country for remittances, but its citizens in the US tend to be more digitally savvy than other large migrant groups. 所以, 花旗银行创建了专门的全球 登陆页面 针对这个利基市场量身定制.
银行’ 尝试建立汇款金融科技
只有少数银行冒险建立专门从事跨境汇款的独立金融科技子公司. 这种方法使他们能够探索数字技术，而不会危及他们的主要品牌. 美国的 BBVA Compass 就是一个典型的例子, 前 BBVA 子公司. It strongly emphasized Latin American markets and ranked among the top thirty US banks in consumer cross-border volume. 然而, 跨境交易量显着下降 2016 促使该银行高管将跨境消费业务纳入其总体战略的优先顺序.
以其创新文化而闻名, BBVA 十月份采取重大举措 2017 by launching a dedicated mobile remittance application. The bank commenced with the USA-to-Mexico corridor and named the appTuyyo, 翻译过来就是‘你和我’。’ 该应用程序提供了基本的用户界面，并且功能有限.
该银行继续收取高于平均水平的保证金, approximately 3% in total, 其中一半来自费用，另一半来自外汇加价. 尽管开展了广泛的公关活动, 推出六个月后, 该应用程序的下载量最少:
Less than two years after the launch, it became apparent that the app couldn’t compete with the leading fintech players in this space, BBVA 宣布关闭其服务.
同样的命运等待着另一家总部位于西班牙、业务遍及全球的银行, 桑坦德. 在 四月 2020, 该银行推出了 PagoFx, 一个聪明的崇拜者:
桑坦德银行只拿了 15 months 关闭 PagoFx 的汇款业务并转向商业支付 帕格尼克斯. 银行一再未能认识到，从专家手中夺取市场份额比通过增强的数字用户体验满足现有客户更具挑战性.
在 2020, it looked like HSBC had learned from the failures of others when it launched its version of Revolut’s multi-currency cross-border wallet, which is only for existing customers and does not have separate branding.
但不是, HSBC also couldn’t resist making the same mistake in 2024 by launching a different brand, 津, 瞄准外部消费者:
Why would consumers happy with Wise and Western Union or their bank’s money transfer flock to HSBC? Those young professionals supposedly dream of becoming “创始人成员” of Zing and getting a limited-edition debit card.
A year later, Zing was shut down. The results were okay in one regard. According to Financial News, HSBC’s Zing acquired 9,000 monthly users out of 131 thousand customers. The shocking part was spending two years and $100M in preparation while hiring 400 employees. What is even worse, HSBC decided to blitz scale across multiple products and 100 corridors—yet, according to FT, failing to prioritize fraud controls in its home country:
Project Green was designed to enhance Zing’s fraud controls, align with regulatory requirements and HSBC’s anti-money laundering policies, and establish a framework for monitoring transactions, according to internal documents.
The overhaul began last summer, when staff were informed that Zing was focusing its resources on the UK market and fixing issues highlighted by the audits, a person familiar with the matter said.
Some staff working on international expansion were subsequently reassigned to work on Project Green and have not been moved back, the person added.
然而, even if HSBC’s Zing had been competent in strategy, 市场营销, 和法规遵从, its setup doomed it. Banks have a long history of failing to scale fintech subsidiaries under separate brands—especially in the unforgiving cross-border consumer transfer space. Rather than leveraging its $11B in C2C x-border transfer volumes in its core business, HSBC repeated the same mistakes as BBVA and Santander before.
Zing will be remembered as yet another extravagant attempt by a bank to cosplay as a fintech—burning through resources with hundreds of employees, lavish referral bonuses, and traditional advertising, all while launching at a breakneck pace rivaling fintechs that took 5–10 years to expand. Contrast that with Wise and Revolut, which raised $1.7B over many years by consistently achieving groundbreaking milestones. 例如, Wise secured just $100M over six rounds spanning five years—by which point, it was already surpassing Western Union Digital and Intermex in volume.
结论
As a class, banks will continue to play a significant role in cross-border money transfers. 尽管他们可能不认为汇款是一种需要争夺更大市场份额的战略产品, 银行将始终保持关注并在汇款服务上进行足够的投资以满足客户的需求. 在极少数情况下，, they may proactively target niche markets with significant growth opportunities. 银行不必担心来自汇款专家的竞争, 包括金融科技公司, these players have significant concerns if banks discontinue offering them correspondent banking services.
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